Controls
A control is a built-in, scope-agnostic standing rule. Agents are auto-subjected by scope rather than wired in one at a time — every agent that falls within a control's scope is held to it, and each finding is that control's per-agent evidence.
| Control | Name | Category | Enforcing defense | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ACC-001 | MFA required for all human users accessing AI platforms MFA required for all human users accessing AI platforms | ACC | None | Built-in |
| ACC-002 | MFA enforced on service accounts where technically supported MFA enforced on service accounts where technically supported | ACC | None | Built-in |
| ACC-003 | Privileged access granted only via PIM / just-in-time activation Privileged access granted only via PIM / just-in-time activation | ACC | None | Built-in |
| ACC-004 | Conditional Access enforces device compliance for sensitive scopes Conditional Access enforces device compliance for sensitive scopes | ACC | None | Built-in |
| ACC-005 | Quarterly access reviews completed for all privileged roles Quarterly access reviews completed for all privileged roles | ACC | None | Built-in |
| ACC-006 | Role-based access control applied to all AI platform resources Role-based access control applied to all AI platform resources | ACC | None | Built-in |
| ACC-007 | Separation of duties between model development and production deployment Separation of duties between model development and production deployment | ACC | None | Built-in |
| ACC-008 | Service principals scoped to least-privilege resource groups Service principals scoped to least-privilege resource groups | ACC | None | Built-in |
| ACC-009 | Workload identities used in place of long-lived secrets Workload identities used in place of long-lived secrets | ACC | None | Built-in |
| ACC-010 | All secrets stored exclusively in Key Vault or HSM All secrets stored exclusively in Key Vault or HSM | ACC | None | Built-in |
| ACC-011 | Secrets rotated at minimum every 90 days Secrets rotated at minimum every 90 days | ACC | None | Built-in |
| ACC-012 | Break-glass accounts protected by two-person approval and monitored Break-glass accounts protected by two-person approval and monitored | ACC | None | Built-in |
| ACC-013 | External collaborators onboarded via B2B federation only External collaborators onboarded via B2B federation only | ACC | None | Built-in |
| ACC-014 | Joiner-mover-leaver process executes within one business day Joiner-mover-leaver process executes within one business day | ACC | None | Built-in |
| ACC-015 | Authentication logs forwarded to SIEM with 12-month retention Authentication logs forwarded to SIEM with 12-month retention | ACC | None | Built-in |
| ACC-016 | No standing access to production AI inference endpoints No standing access to production AI inference endpoints | ACC | None | Built-in |
| ACC-017 | Authentication risk scoring informs adaptive Conditional Access Authentication risk scoring informs adaptive Conditional Access | ACC | None | Built-in |
| ACC-018 | Sign-in risk policies block high-risk authentication events Sign-in risk policies block high-risk authentication events | ACC | None | Built-in |
| ACC-019 | User risk policies require credential reset on compromise indicator User risk policies require credential reset on compromise indicator | ACC | None | Built-in |
| ACC-020 | Token lifetime policies enforced per workload sensitivity tier Token lifetime policies enforced per workload sensitivity tier | ACC | None | Built-in |
| ACC-021 | Refresh tokens revoked automatically on JML termination Refresh tokens revoked automatically on JML termination | ACC | None | Built-in |
| ACC-022 | SSH key inventory current and keys rotated annually SSH key inventory current and keys rotated annually | ACC | None | Built-in |
| ACC-023 | SSH keys for tier-1 access stored on hardware tokens SSH keys for tier-1 access stored on hardware tokens | ACC | None | Built-in |
| ACC-024 | Just-Enough-Access principle applied at resource group scope Just-Enough-Access principle applied at resource group scope | ACC | None | Built-in |
| ACC-025 | Group lifecycle managed via Entra access packages Group lifecycle managed via Entra access packages | ACC | None | Built-in |
| ACC-026 | Attribute-based access control used where RBAC is insufficient Attribute-based access control used where RBAC is insufficient | ACC | None | Built-in |
| ACC-027 | Network access to AI control plane restricted to allowlist Network access to AI control plane restricted to allowlist | ACC | None | Built-in |
| ACC-028 | Private endpoints used for all data-plane access to AI services Private endpoints used for all data-plane access to AI services | ACC | None | Built-in |
| ACC-029 | Public IP usage on AI workloads requires approved exception Public IP usage on AI workloads requires approved exception | ACC | None | Built-in |
| ACC-030 | Privileged Access Workstation required for tier-0 administration Privileged Access Workstation required for tier-0 administration | ACC | None | Built-in |
| adversarial_red_team | Adversarial / Red-Team Testing Adversarial robustness, prompt-injection resistance, and red-team exercises. GPAI evaluation under EU AI Act Article 15. | security | None | Built-in |
| adverse_action_reason_codes | Adverse-Action / Reason Codes Specific principal-reason codes for adverse decisions (ECOA Reg B, FCRA). SHAP / counterfactual reason codes mapped to actual feature contributions. | fairness | None | Built-in |
| agent_permission_scope | Agent Permission Scope Requires that every agent action stay inside its granted permission scope, so an autonomous agent cannot invoke capabilities, identities, or data beyond what it was provisioned for. This directly addresses OWASP LLM08 Excessive Agency and MITRE ATLAS AML.T0048, and supports NIST AI RMF MANAGE 4.2, ISO 42001 A.6.2.5, and SOC 2 CC6.1 least-privilege expectations. EvidentAI evidences it by tagging spans carrying agent.scope_violation, which mark calls that exceeded the agent's authorized scope, and maps those tagged spans to the listed frameworks as exception evidence for the access-control narrative. | — | Built-in | |
| ai_model_inventory | AI / Model Inventory Comprehensive registry of every AI/ML system in production including third-party models. Risk-tiered by materiality, complexity, and criticality. | governance | None | Built-in |
| ai_spend_token_budget | AI Spend — Per-Trace Token Budget A cost-governance control requiring that no trace exceed its configured token ceiling: what good looks like is every trace completing within budget while runaway or looping agents are stopped before they burn unbounded spend. This matters for AI financial governance and runaway-loop containment, where an unconstrained agent recursion or tool-calling loop can multiply gen_ai token usage and cost without producing value, a denial-of-wallet and reliability risk. EvidentAI measures it by having the cost-router sum gen_ai token usage across the trace and set `evidentai.token_budget.breached == true` when the ceiling is crossed; the selector match raises a budget_breach finding and, when the defense is set to enforce_interrupt mode rather than monitor, can interrupt the run, giving operators an auditable per-trace spend record and an automatic stop on runaway behavior. | — | Built-in | |
| aml_transaction_monitoring_alerts | AML Transaction-Monitoring Alerts Requires that AI agents performing transaction monitoring under the Bank Secrecy Act (31 CFR 1020.320) generate, escalate, and disposition alerts on potentially suspicious activity so that reportable conduct is surfaced for SAR evaluation rather than missed. This matters because gaps in alert coverage or unexplained alert suppression expose the institution to FinCEN enforcement and civil money penalties, and AI-driven scoring must remain explainable and auditable. EvidentAI tags every span where aml.alert == true, capturing the alert payload, model rationale, and disposition, and maps the evidence to BSA/AML program-effectiveness controls and NIST AI RMF MEASURE for ongoing monitoring of decision quality. | — | None | Built-in |
| automated_decision_disclosure | Automated-Decision Disclosure Requires that any solely-automated decision producing a legal or similarly significant effect on a person carries an explicit disclosure to the affected individual, satisfying GDPR Art. 22 / Art. 13(2)(f) transparency duties and emerging US state ADMT rules (e.g., CCPA/CPRA automated decision-making regulations). The disclosure obligation matters because undisclosed automated decisioning exposes the operator to enforcement and invalidates downstream consent. EvidentAI evaluates the selector evidentai.admt.disclosed == true against each ingested span and, on a match, tags the span onto the evidence row's framework_mappings, producing regulator-readable proof that the disclosure event fired on the decisioning trace. | — | None | Built-in |
| BCM-001 | AI workload Business Impact Analysis completed AI workload Business Impact Analysis completed | BCM | None | Built-in |
| BCM-002 | Recovery Time Objective (RTO) defined per use case Recovery Time Objective (RTO) defined per use case | BCM | None | Built-in |
| BCM-003 | Recovery Point Objective (RPO) defined per use case Recovery Point Objective (RPO) defined per use case | BCM | None | Built-in |
| BCM-004 | Disaster recovery plan tested annually for AI workloads Disaster recovery plan tested annually for AI workloads | BCM | None | Built-in |
| BCM-005 | Multi-region deployment for tier-1 inference endpoints Multi-region deployment for tier-1 inference endpoints | BCM | None | Built-in |
| BCM-006 | Failover automation tested quarterly Failover automation tested quarterly | BCM | None | Built-in |
| BCM-007 | Graceful degradation mode defined per use case (deterministic fallback) Graceful degradation mode defined per use case (deterministic fallback) | BCM | None | Built-in |
| BCM-008 | Foundation model multi-vendor fallback configured Foundation model multi-vendor fallback configured | BCM | None | Built-in |
| BCM-009 | Capacity planning model updated quarterly Capacity planning model updated quarterly | BCM | None | Built-in |
| BCM-010 | Inference scaling tested under load Inference scaling tested under load | BCM | None | Built-in |
| BCM-011 | Dependency map maintained for AI workloads Dependency map maintained for AI workloads | BCM | None | Built-in |
| BCM-012 | Single points of failure identified and remediated Single points of failure identified and remediated | BCM | None | Built-in |
| BCM-013 | Crisis communication plan includes AI-specific scenarios Crisis communication plan includes AI-specific scenarios | BCM | None | Built-in |
| BCM-014 | Reputational risk scenarios included in tabletop exercises Reputational risk scenarios included in tabletop exercises | BCM | None | Built-in |
| BCM-015 | Insurance coverage reviewed for AI-specific risks Insurance coverage reviewed for AI-specific risks | BCM | None | Built-in |
| BCM-016 | Critical vendor concentration risk monitored Critical vendor concentration risk monitored | BCM | None | Built-in |
| BCM-017 | Resilience SLA reported quarterly to leadership Resilience SLA reported quarterly to leadership | BCM | None | Built-in |
| BCM-018 | Cloud region outage runbook current and rehearsed Cloud region outage runbook current and rehearsed | BCM | None | Built-in |
| BCM-019 | Provider quota / rate-limit headroom tracked Provider quota / rate-limit headroom tracked | BCM | None | Built-in |
| BCM-020 | Inference quota burst protection via queue and degrade modes Inference quota burst protection via queue and degrade modes | BCM | None | Built-in |
| BCM-021 | Region-aware data flow for tenant data residency Region-aware data flow for tenant data residency | BCM | None | Built-in |
| BCM-022 | Annual resilience report produced for board / regulator Annual resilience report produced for board / regulator | BCM | None | Built-in |
| best_execution_decision_capture | Best-Execution Decision Capture This control requires that every order-routing or trade-execution decision made by an AI agent record the selected execution venue and the rationale tying that choice to the firm's duty to seek the most favorable terms reasonably available under the circumstances. It addresses FINRA Rule 5310 (Best Execution) and SEC Reg NMS expectations, where unexplained or undocumented venue selection exposes the firm to regulatory and customer-harm risk. EvidentAI tags spans where the best_ex.venue field is present, capturing the venue identifier alongside the decision context, and maps the evidence to capital-markets best-execution and supervisory-control frameworks for audit reconstruction. | — | None | Built-in |
| bias_fairness_testing | Bias / Fairness Testing Pre-deployment and ongoing disparate-treatment and disparate-impact testing across protected classes. Search for less-discriminatory alternatives. | fairness | None | Built-in |
| claims_handling_decision_capture | Claims-Handling Decision Capture Requires that each AI-assisted insurance claims decision (approve, deny, partial, or referral) be captured with its basis so the insurer can demonstrate fair, timely, and non-discriminatory adjudication under state unfair-claims-settlement-practices acts and NAIC model standards. Undocumented or inconsistent claim outcomes drive bad-faith litigation, market-conduct exam findings, and unfair-discrimination risk in automated adjudication. EvidentAI tags spans where claims.decision is present, recording the outcome, supporting rationale, and reviewer context, and maps them to NIST AI RMF MAP/MEASURE controls for traceable, contestable automated decisions. | — | None | Built-in |
| conflict_of_interest_disclosure | Conflict-of-Interest Disclosure This control verifies that when an AI agent acts in a context carrying a material conflict of interest, the conflict is affirmatively disclosed to the customer rather than suppressed. It supports SEC Reg BI's Conflict of Interest Obligation and the Investment Advisers Act fiduciary duty to eliminate or fully disclose conflicts, since undisclosed conflicts are a recurring driver of enforcement actions. EvidentAI tags spans where coi.disclosed evaluates to true, evidencing that the disclosure occurred and was recorded at the point of recommendation, and maps these to conduct and fiduciary-duty control families. | — | None | Built-in |
| consent_check_before_processing | Consent Check Before Processing Requires that a valid, recorded consent be verified before personal data is processed by an agent or model, enforcing the GDPR Art. 6(1)(a)/Art. 7 lawful-processing precondition and equivalent CCPA opt-in regimes for sensitive data. It matters because processing without a verified consent state is a per-record violation that taints every downstream inference and the evidence derived from it. EvidentAI runs this control through the pii-redactor evaluator, matching spans where evidentai.consent.verified == true and tagging them into the evidence framework_mappings so each processing event is provably gated on a checked consent flag rather than assumed. | — | Built-in | |
| cross_border_transfer_tag | Cross-Border Transfer Tag Requires that every span touching personal data carry a region attribute so cross-border data flows can be identified and assessed against transfer-restriction regimes (GDPR Chapter V / SCCs, data-residency commitments, and sector rules like GLBA). Untagged region provenance is the root cause of unlawful third-country transfers and breaks data-residency attestations. EvidentAI applies the selector evidentai.region is present (non-null) to each span and tags matched spans into the evidence row's framework_mappings, giving auditors a continuous record of where each processing event occurred for residency and transfer analysis. | — | Built-in | |
| cross_boundary_chain_integrity | Cross-Boundary Chain Integrity Requires that a child run's genesis record anchor to the SHA-256 hash of the initiating span in the parent run, extending the tamper-evident chain across the run boundary into a hash-linked Merkle DAG over the causal graph (req-20 R-7). Tampering with any ancestor invalidates the anchors of every descendant, and forging a child's origin or detaching it from its parent breaks verification end to end. EvidentAI evidences it by persisting the parent initiating-span hash on each child's genesis and verifying the anchor chain from a downstream regulated action back to the root originator. | — | None | Built-in |
| DAT-001 | Training data classified per enterprise data sensitivity policy Training data classified per enterprise data sensitivity policy | DAT | None | Built-in |
| DAT-002 | PII tokenized or removed before model training PII tokenized or removed before model training | DAT | None | Built-in |
| DAT-003 | Data lineage tracked from source to model output Data lineage tracked from source to model output | DAT | None | Built-in |
| DAT-004 | Synthetic data flagged in metadata to distinguish from real-world data Synthetic data flagged in metadata to distinguish from real-world data | DAT | None | Built-in |
| DAT-005 | Retention policy enforced per jurisdiction and data type Retention policy enforced per jurisdiction and data type | DAT | None | Built-in |
| DAT-006 | Cross-border data transfer reviewed against adequacy decisions and SCCs Cross-border data transfer reviewed against adequacy decisions and SCCs | DAT | None | Built-in |
| DAT-007 | RAG indexes scanned for sensitive content before publish RAG indexes scanned for sensitive content before publish | DAT | None | Built-in |
| DAT-008 | Right-to-deletion requests processed within statutory window Right-to-deletion requests processed within statutory window | DAT | None | Built-in |
| DAT-009 | Customer data isolated by tenant at the storage layer Customer data isolated by tenant at the storage layer | DAT | None | Built-in |
| DAT-010 | Customer-managed keys (CMK) used for Tier-1 data at rest Customer-managed keys (CMK) used for Tier-1 data at rest | DAT | None | Built-in |
| DAT-011 | TLS 1.2+ enforced for all in-transit data; 1.3 preferred TLS 1.2+ enforced for all in-transit data; 1.3 preferred | DAT | None | Built-in |
| DAT-012 | Backup integrity verified monthly with restore test Backup integrity verified monthly with restore test | DAT | None | Built-in |
| DAT-013 | Purpose limitation documented in DPIA for each use case Purpose limitation documented in DPIA for each use case | DAT | None | Built-in |
| DAT-014 | Vector database access scoped by tenant identity at retrieval Vector database access scoped by tenant identity at retrieval | DAT | None | Built-in |
| DAT-015 | Data sovereignty enforced via region pinning per jurisdiction Data sovereignty enforced via region pinning per jurisdiction | DAT | None | Built-in |
| DAT-016 | Data residency exceptions logged, approved, and time-bound Data residency exceptions logged, approved, and time-bound | DAT | None | Built-in |
| DAT-017 | Sensitive data exfiltration detection (DLP) on storage egress Sensitive data exfiltration detection (DLP) on storage egress | DAT | None | Built-in |
| DAT-018 | Sensitive-data scanner runs continuously on data lake Sensitive-data scanner runs continuously on data lake | DAT | None | Built-in |
| DAT-019 | Training data poisoning detection scans for backdoor triggers Training data poisoning detection scans for backdoor triggers | DAT | None | Built-in |
| DAT-020 | Training data deduplicated to limit memorization and leakage risk Training data deduplicated to limit memorization and leakage risk | DAT | None | Built-in |
| DAT-021 | Training data canary records inserted for leakage detection Training data canary records inserted for leakage detection | DAT | None | Built-in |
| DAT-022 | Data quality metrics (completeness, accuracy, freshness) tracked per dataset Data quality metrics (completeness, accuracy, freshness) tracked per dataset | DAT | None | Built-in |
| DAT-023 | Schema evolution tracked and tested with breaking-change controls Schema evolution tracked and tested with breaking-change controls | DAT | None | Built-in |
| DAT-024 | Data contracts enforced at ingestion boundaries Data contracts enforced at ingestion boundaries | DAT | None | Built-in |
| DAT-025 | Data minimization documented per use case and reviewed annually Data minimization documented per use case and reviewed annually | DAT | None | Built-in |
| DAT-026 | Pseudonymization keys rotated per documented policy Pseudonymization keys rotated per documented policy | DAT | None | Built-in |
| DAT-027 | Cross-tenant data leakage tested in non-prod prior to release Cross-tenant data leakage tested in non-prod prior to release | DAT | None | Built-in |
| DAT-028 | Embedding versions tracked and pinned for RAG indexes Embedding versions tracked and pinned for RAG indexes | DAT | None | Built-in |
| DAT-029 | Index re-vectorization triggered on embedding model change Index re-vectorization triggered on embedding model change | DAT | None | Built-in |
| DAT-030 | Vector similarity threshold tuned and reviewed per use case Vector similarity threshold tuned and reviewed per use case | DAT | None | Built-in |
| DAT-031 | Customer data export available within statutory window (portability) Customer data export available within statutory window (portability) | DAT | None | Built-in |
| DAT-032 | Data Subject Access Request workflow audited quarterly Data Subject Access Request workflow audited quarterly | DAT | None | Built-in |
| DAT-033 | Children's data special handling for COPPA / age-restricted compliance Children's data special handling for COPPA / age-restricted compliance | DAT | None | Built-in |
| DAT-034 | Biometric data processed under special-category controls Biometric data processed under special-category controls | DAT | None | Built-in |
| DAT-035 | Training data integrity hash verified before training run Training data integrity hash verified before training run | DAT | None | Built-in |
| DAT-036 | RAG document sanitization strips executable content and scripts RAG document sanitization strips executable content and scripts | DAT | None | Built-in |
| DAT-037 | RAG chunking strategy documented and reviewed for content boundaries RAG chunking strategy documented and reviewed for content boundaries | DAT | None | Built-in |
| DAT-038 | Vector embeddings encrypted at rest with tenant-scoped keys Vector embeddings encrypted at rest with tenant-scoped keys | DAT | None | Built-in |
| DAT-039 | Retrieval results filtered through safety classifier before LLM assembly Retrieval results filtered through safety classifier before LLM assembly | DAT | None | Built-in |
| DAT-040 | Retrieval citations validated against source content for accuracy Retrieval citations validated against source content for accuracy | DAT | None | Built-in |
| data_governance_lineage | Data Governance / Lineage Training-data and inference-input provenance, lineage, and quality controls. Covers data minimization, retention, and cross-border transfer mechanisms. | data | Built-in | |
| data_subject_request_handling | Data-Subject Request Handling Requires that data-subject access, erasure, and rectification requests be tracked end-to-end with a request identifier, evidencing the operator's response duties under GDPR Arts. 12-22 and CCPA consumer-rights provisions (and their statutory windows). Without a traceable request id, an organization cannot prove it acted on a DSAR within the mandated deadline, which is a direct enforcement exposure. EvidentAI matches spans where evidentai.dsar.request_id is present and tags them into the evidence framework_mappings, linking the agent activity that fulfilled a request to that request for downstream SLA and completeness verification. | — | None | Built-in |
| delegation_scope_attenuation | Delegation Scope Attenuation Requires that the scope granted to a child run be a subset of the scope held by the granting run, which in turn must be a subset of the root principal's authority — scope SHOULD narrow at each hop (req-20 R-5/R-13). Any initiation edge whose downstream scope exceeds the granting run or the root principal is flagged as privilege escalation through delegation, the confused-deputy problem at chain scale. EvidentAI evidences it by diffing granted_scope against parent_scope on each persisted initiation edge and reporting non-attenuating edges; the flagship case is the upsell (marketing:offer.present) -> loan_app (lending:originate,credit_bureau:pull) edge. | — | None | Built-in |
| DEP-001 | Production changes only through CI/CD pipeline Production changes only through CI/CD pipeline | DEP | None | Built-in |
| DEP-002 | Infrastructure-as-Code mandatory for all AI workloads Infrastructure-as-Code mandatory for all AI workloads | DEP | None | Built-in |
| DEP-003 | IaC changes require security scan pass (Checkov / tfsec) IaC changes require security scan pass (Checkov / tfsec) | DEP | None | Built-in |
| DEP-004 | No direct portal or CLI changes to production resources No direct portal or CLI changes to production resources | DEP | None | Built-in |
| DEP-005 | Deployments require change advisory board approval Deployments require change advisory board approval | DEP | None | Built-in |
| DEP-006 | Canary deployments for model changes affecting >5% of traffic Canary deployments for model changes affecting >5% of traffic | DEP | None | Built-in |
| DEP-007 | Rollback procedure tested quarterly with documented runbook Rollback procedure tested quarterly with documented runbook | DEP | None | Built-in |
| DEP-008 | Out-of-window deployments require documented emergency approval Out-of-window deployments require documented emergency approval | DEP | None | Built-in |
| DEP-009 | Feature flags used for staged rollout of model and prompt changes Feature flags used for staged rollout of model and prompt changes | DEP | None | Built-in |
| DEP-010 | SBOM generated and stored for every production deployment SBOM generated and stored for every production deployment | DEP | None | Built-in |
| DEP-011 | Container images scanned before push to registry Container images scanned before push to registry | DEP | None | Built-in |
| DEP-012 | Signed container images required in production Signed container images required in production | DEP | None | Built-in |
| DEP-013 | Deployment artifacts retained for 7 years for audit traceability Deployment artifacts retained for 7 years for audit traceability | DEP | None | Built-in |
| DEP-014 | Blue-green deployment used for critical inference endpoints Blue-green deployment used for critical inference endpoints | DEP | None | Built-in |
| DEP-015 | Pipeline credentials use OIDC federation, not stored secrets Pipeline credentials use OIDC federation, not stored secrets | DEP | None | Built-in |
| DEP-016 | CI jobs run on clean, ephemeral, immutable agents CI jobs run on clean, ephemeral, immutable agents | DEP | None | Built-in |
| DEP-017 | Build provenance attestations produced (SLSA Level 3 target) Build provenance attestations produced (SLSA Level 3 target) | DEP | None | Built-in |
| DEP-018 | Artifact integrity verified at deploy time via signature check Artifact integrity verified at deploy time via signature check | DEP | None | Built-in |
| DEP-019 | Configuration drift detected and remediated within 24 hours Configuration drift detected and remediated within 24 hours | DEP | None | Built-in |
| DEP-020 | Production secrets fetched at runtime, never baked into images Production secrets fetched at runtime, never baked into images | DEP | None | Built-in |
| DEP-021 | Environment promotion follows documented progression dev->test->stage->prod Environment promotion follows documented progression dev->test->stage->prod | DEP | None | Built-in |
| DEP-022 | Production direct access reserved for break-glass emergencies only Production direct access reserved for break-glass emergencies only | DEP | None | Built-in |
| DEP-023 | Deployment metadata exported to CMDB for asset traceability Deployment metadata exported to CMDB for asset traceability | DEP | None | Built-in |
| DEP-024 | Pull-request templates require security, risk, and rollback fields Pull-request templates require security, risk, and rollback fields | DEP | None | Built-in |
| DEP-025 | Branch protection mandates two approvers for protected paths Branch protection mandates two approvers for protected paths | DEP | None | Built-in |
| DEP-026 | CODEOWNERS enforced on AI-critical paths (models, prompts, policies) CODEOWNERS enforced on AI-critical paths (models, prompts, policies) | DEP | None | Built-in |
| DEP-027 | Pipeline runs scanned for typosquatting / dependency confusion Pipeline runs scanned for typosquatting / dependency confusion | DEP | None | Built-in |
| DEP-028 | License compliance scan executed pre-deploy (SPDX inventory) License compliance scan executed pre-deploy (SPDX inventory) | DEP | None | Built-in |
| EVL-001 | Evaluation harness reproducible across environments Evaluation harness reproducible across environments | EVL | None | Built-in |
| EVL-002 | Golden eval set protected from training-data contamination Golden eval set protected from training-data contamination | EVL | None | Built-in |
| EVL-003 | Eval coverage tracked across use cases and personas Eval coverage tracked across use cases and personas | EVL | None | Built-in |
| EVL-004 | Baseline metrics anchored at major releases for regression comparison Baseline metrics anchored at major releases for regression comparison | EVL | None | Built-in |
| EVL-005 | Eval-as-code with versioned, signed eval suites Eval-as-code with versioned, signed eval suites | EVL | None | Built-in |
| EVL-006 | Statistical significance required for go / no-go decisions Statistical significance required for go / no-go decisions | EVL | None | Built-in |
| EVL-007 | Data drift monitored per feature (PSI, KL divergence) Data drift monitored per feature (PSI, KL divergence) | EVL | None | Built-in |
| EVL-008 | Concept drift monitored via prediction distribution shift Concept drift monitored via prediction distribution shift | EVL | None | Built-in |
| EVL-009 | Label drift monitored where ground truth becomes available Label drift monitored where ground truth becomes available | EVL | None | Built-in |
| EVL-010 | Embedding drift monitored for retrieval systems Embedding drift monitored for retrieval systems | EVL | None | Built-in |
| EVL-011 | Prompt drift monitored via response distribution shift Prompt drift monitored via response distribution shift | EVL | None | Built-in |
| EVL-012 | Response anomaly scoring per output Response anomaly scoring per output | EVL | None | Built-in |
| EVL-013 | Semantic anomaly detection via embedding distance Semantic anomaly detection via embedding distance | EVL | None | Built-in |
| EVL-014 | Factual consistency checks against retrieved context Factual consistency checks against retrieved context | EVL | None | Built-in |
| EVL-015 | Sycophancy detection in conversational systems Sycophancy detection in conversational systems | EVL | None | Built-in |
| EVL-016 | Response coherence scored per turn Response coherence scored per turn | EVL | None | Built-in |
| EVL-017 | Hallucination rate measured per use case per release Hallucination rate measured per use case per release | EVL | None | Built-in |
| EVL-018 | Grounding score distribution monitored Grounding score distribution monitored | EVL | None | Built-in |
| EVL-019 | Citation accuracy verified via retrieval check Citation accuracy verified via retrieval check | EVL | None | Built-in |
| EVL-020 | Response style consistency monitored Response style consistency monitored | EVL | None | Built-in |
| EVL-021 | Output entropy / diversity tracked to detect mode collapse Output entropy / diversity tracked to detect mode collapse | EVL | None | Built-in |
| EVL-022 | Refusal calibration measured against expected refusal rate Refusal calibration measured against expected refusal rate | EVL | None | Built-in |
| EVL-023 | Toxicity drift monitored quarterly Toxicity drift monitored quarterly | EVL | None | Built-in |
| EVL-024 | Bias drift monitored per protected attribute Bias drift monitored per protected attribute | EVL | None | Built-in |
| EVL-025 | Performance regression detection per release Performance regression detection per release | EVL | None | Built-in |
| EVL-026 | A/B test framework for prompt and model changes A/B test framework for prompt and model changes | EVL | None | Built-in |
| EVL-027 | Shadow eval against production traffic Shadow eval against production traffic | EVL | None | Built-in |
| EVL-028 | Human evaluation panel for high-stakes use cases Human evaluation panel for high-stakes use cases | EVL | None | Built-in |
| EVL-029 | Inter-annotator agreement measured on eval sets Inter-annotator agreement measured on eval sets | EVL | None | Built-in |
| EVL-030 | Eval result aggregation per use case for governance reporting Eval result aggregation per use case for governance reporting | EVL | None | Built-in |
| EVL-031 | Eval failures trigger CI block automatically Eval failures trigger CI block automatically | EVL | None | Built-in |
| EVL-032 | Multi-turn conversation evaluation framework maintained Multi-turn conversation evaluation framework maintained | EVL | None | Built-in |
| EVL-033 | Long-context evaluation (needle-in-haystack) executed for long-context models Long-context evaluation (needle-in-haystack) executed for long-context models | EVL | None | Built-in |
| EVL-034 | Robustness evaluation against perturbed inputs Robustness evaluation against perturbed inputs | EVL | None | Built-in |
| EVL-035 | Adversarial robustness measured per release Adversarial robustness measured per release | EVL | None | Built-in |
| EVL-036 | Domain-specific evaluation suites maintained for in-scope industries Domain-specific evaluation suites maintained for in-scope industries | EVL | None | Built-in |
| EVL-037 | Regulatory-specific evaluation (fair lending, FCRA, etc.) Regulatory-specific evaluation (fair lending, FCRA, etc.) | EVL | None | Built-in |
| EVL-038 | Eval result lineage tracked from model -> eval -> dashboard Eval result lineage tracked from model -> eval -> dashboard | EVL | None | Built-in |
| EVL-039 | Production sampling for offline eval Production sampling for offline eval | EVL | None | Built-in |
| EVL-040 | Eval data refreshed quarterly to prevent overfitting Eval data refreshed quarterly to prevent overfitting | EVL | None | Built-in |
| fcra_dispute_resolution | FCRA Dispute Resolution Requires that consumer disputes of credit-report or decision data be logged, investigated, and resolved within the statutory window under FCRA section 611 (15 USC 1681i), including reinvestigation and correction or deletion of inaccurate information. Mishandled disputes are a frequent source of CFPB enforcement and private FCRA litigation, and AI agents touching dispute workflows must leave an auditable trail of the reinvestigation. EvidentAI tags spans carrying an fcra.dispute_id, preserving the dispute intake, investigation steps, and outcome, and maps the evidence to FCRA accuracy/dispute controls and NIST AI RMF GOVERN for accountable handling. | — | None | Built-in |
| fcra_permissible_purpose_check | FCRA Permissible-Purpose Check Requires that a consumer report be accessed only for a permissible purpose enumerated in FCRA section 604 (15 USC 1681b), such as a credit application, account review, or written consumer authorization, before the pull occurs. Obtaining or furnishing a report without permissible purpose is a per-se FCRA violation carrying statutory damages and regulatory exposure, so the justification must be recorded at the point of access. EvidentAI tags spans where fcra.permissible_purpose is present, evidencing that the agent asserted and logged a valid purpose prior to the inquiry, and maps it to FCRA access-control requirements and NIST AI RMF MAP for documented authorization. | — | None | Built-in |
| human_oversight | Human Oversight Human-in-the-loop gates for consequential decisions (credit, employment, healthcare). Reviewer authority to override, contest, or escalate AI outputs. | governance | None | Built-in |
| identity_theft_red_flag_detection | Identity-Theft Red-Flag Detection Requires detection and response to identity-theft warning signs under the FCRA Red Flags Rule (16 CFR 681.1 / Reg V), so that suspicious indicators in account opening or maintenance trigger the institution's Identity Theft Prevention Program. Missing a red flag exposes consumers to fraud and the institution to regulatory findings for an ineffective program, and automated agents must surface and route these signals rather than silently proceed. EvidentAI tags spans where identity_theft.red_flag == true, capturing the triggering indicator and the agent's response path, and maps the evidence to Red Flags Rule program controls and NIST AI RMF MEASURE for monitoring detection efficacy. | — | None | Built-in |
| impact_assessment | Impact / FRIA / DPIA Combined impact assessment satisfying EU FRIA, GDPR DPIA, Colorado AI Act, and CCPA risk-assessment requirements for high-risk AI systems. | governance | None | Built-in |
| incident_response | Incident Response AI-specific incident response: prompt injection, training-data poisoning, model theft, hallucinated regulatory advice. Regulator notification timelines. | security | Built-in | |
| initiation_depth_limit | Initiation Depth Limit Requires a maximum initiation depth across a causal chain of workflow runs, so a fully agentic chain cannot grow without bound when no human is in the loop (req-20 R-9). An initiation attempt past the configured depth is denied and recorded; in enforce mode the deny stops the spawn rather than only logging it. EvidentAI evidences it by carrying the current depth in the in-band signed chain summary and evaluating it at the initiation point, writing evidence when the ceiling is reached. | — | None | Built-in |
| kyc_verification_check | KYC Verification Check Requires Customer Identification Program verification of identity at onboarding and at risk-based refresh, satisfying the CIP rule (31 CFR 1020.220) and the FinCEN Customer Due Diligence requirements before an account or relationship proceeds. Failure to verify before granting access creates AML and identity-fraud exposure and is a recurring examiner finding. EvidentAI tags spans carrying a kyc.verification_id, evidencing that the agent obtained and recorded a completed verification artifact for the customer, and maps the result to BSA/AML CIP/CDD controls and to NIST AI RMF GOVERN/MAP for documented decision provenance. | — | None | Built-in |
| lawful_basis_attribute | GDPR Lawful-Basis Attribute Requires that each processing span declare the GDPR Art. 6 lawful basis (consent, contract, legal obligation, vital interests, public task, or legitimate interests) under which the personal data is handled, operationalizing the accountability principle of Art. 5(2). Processing with no asserted lawful basis is unlawful on its face and cannot be remediated retroactively, so the attribute must be captured at the point of processing. EvidentAI evaluates evidentai.gdpr.lawful_basis is present against each span and tags matched spans into the evidence row's framework_mappings, producing a per-event ledger of the asserted lawful basis for regulator review. | — | None | Built-in |
| logging_recordkeeping | Logging & Recordkeeping Tamper-evident logs of prompts, outputs, inputs, decisions, and model versions. Retention windows aligned to regulatory minimums (Reg B 25 mo, CA FEHA 4 yr). | observability | Built-in | |
| marketing_rule_substantiation | Marketing Rule 206(4)-1 Substantiation This control requires that any performance claim, testimonial, or statement of material fact produced in advertising or marketing content be substantiated with a reasonable basis before dissemination. It enforces the SEC Marketing Rule (Investment Advisers Act Rule 206(4)-1), which prohibits unsubstantiated or misleading advertisements and requires advisers to have records demonstrating the basis for performance claims. EvidentAI tags spans where marketing.substantiated is true, linking the claim to its supporting evidence and review, and maps these records to advertising-compliance and books-and-records control families to demonstrate the firm met its substantiation burden. | — | None | Built-in |
| market_surveillance_alert | Market Surveillance Alert This control captures cases where an AI agent's behavioral surveillance logic raises an alert for potentially manipulative or abusive trading patterns such as spoofing, layering, wash trading, or insider activity. It underpins exchange and SRO market-integrity obligations under the Securities Exchange Act and FINRA surveillance rules, and Dodd-Frank/CFTC anti-manipulation provisions, where failure to detect and escalate suspicious activity is itself a supervisory failure. EvidentAI tags spans where surveillance.alert is true, preserving the alert and its triggering signals as time-stamped evidence, and maps them to market-abuse and supervisory-surveillance frameworks for examiner review. | — | None | Built-in |
| MDL-001 | Model card maintained for every production model Model card maintained for every production model | MDL | None | Built-in |
| MDL-002 | Model inventory reviewed quarterly and includes shadow-AI discovery Model inventory reviewed quarterly and includes shadow-AI discovery | MDL | None | Built-in |
| MDL-003 | Model risk tier assigned at onboarding using four-tier scale Model risk tier assigned at onboarding using four-tier scale | MDL | None | Built-in |
| MDL-004 | Independent validation required for Tier-1 models before production Independent validation required for Tier-1 models before production | MDL | None | Built-in |
| MDL-005 | Model performance monitored against baseline with SLI tracking Model performance monitored against baseline with SLI tracking | MDL | None | Built-in |
| MDL-006 | Fairness metrics tracked per protected class for in-scope models Fairness metrics tracked per protected class for in-scope models | MDL | None | Built-in |
| MDL-007 | Data and concept drift detection alerts wired to SIEM Data and concept drift detection alerts wired to SIEM | MDL | None | Built-in |
| MDL-008 | Model decommission process documented and includes data deletion Model decommission process documented and includes data deletion | MDL | None | Built-in |
| MDL-009 | Foundation-model vendors assessed annually for DPA, AUP, and security posture Foundation-model vendors assessed annually for DPA, AUP, and security posture | MDL | None | Built-in |
| MDL-010 | Fine-tuning datasets logged with provenance (hash, source, license) Fine-tuning datasets logged with provenance (hash, source, license) | MDL | None | Built-in |
| MDL-011 | Model version pinned in production manifests; no floating tags Model version pinned in production manifests; no floating tags | MDL | None | Built-in |
| MDL-012 | Shadow deployment required minimum 7 days before traffic cutover Shadow deployment required minimum 7 days before traffic cutover | MDL | None | Built-in |
| MDL-013 | Adverse action notices reviewed for explainability adequacy Adverse action notices reviewed for explainability adequacy | MDL | None | Built-in |
| MDL-014 | Champion-challenger comparisons documented for credit and risk models Champion-challenger comparisons documented for credit and risk models | MDL | None | Built-in |
| MDL-015 | Model lineage tracked from training data through to inference output Model lineage tracked from training data through to inference output | MDL | None | Built-in |
| MDL-016 | Pre-production hold-out evaluation set protected from training contamination Pre-production hold-out evaluation set protected from training contamination | MDL | None | Built-in |
| MDL-017 | Model evaluation harness reproducible across environments Model evaluation harness reproducible across environments | MDL | None | Built-in |
| MDL-018 | Robustness testing against adversarial perturbations executed per release Robustness testing against adversarial perturbations executed per release | MDL | None | Built-in |
| MDL-019 | Membership-inference attack testing for sensitive models Membership-inference attack testing for sensitive models | MDL | None | Built-in |
| MDL-020 | Out-of-distribution detection wired to circuit breaker on inference path Out-of-distribution detection wired to circuit breaker on inference path | MDL | None | Built-in |
| MDL-021 | Calibration metrics tracked for probabilistic outputs (ECE, Brier) Calibration metrics tracked for probabilistic outputs (ECE, Brier) | MDL | None | Built-in |
| MDL-022 | Model interpretability artifacts produced (SHAP / LIME) for in-scope models Model interpretability artifacts produced (SHAP / LIME) for in-scope models | MDL | None | Built-in |
| MDL-023 | Pre-deployment bias assessment completed with documented thresholds Pre-deployment bias assessment completed with documented thresholds | MDL | None | Built-in |
| MDL-024 | Disparate-impact analysis for credit, employment, housing, insurance use cases Disparate-impact analysis for credit, employment, housing, insurance use cases | MDL | None | Built-in |
| MDL-025 | Champion-challenger transition criteria documented and enforced Champion-challenger transition criteria documented and enforced | MDL | None | Built-in |
| MDL-026 | Model retraining triggered by documented data/performance criteria Model retraining triggered by documented data/performance criteria | MDL | None | Built-in |
| MDL-027 | Foundation model context window limits enforced at gateway Foundation model context window limits enforced at gateway | MDL | None | Built-in |
| MDL-028 | Foundation model token budget enforced per use case and tenant Foundation model token budget enforced per use case and tenant | MDL | None | Built-in |
| MDL-029 | Foundation model upgrade impact assessed pre-rollout Foundation model upgrade impact assessed pre-rollout | MDL | None | Built-in |
| MDL-030 | Model output entropy / confidence threshold enforced per use case Model output entropy / confidence threshold enforced per use case | MDL | None | Built-in |
| MDL-031 | Synthetic monitoring probes run continuously against inference endpoints Synthetic monitoring probes run continuously against inference endpoints | MDL | None | Built-in |
| MDL-032 | Cost-per-inference tracked per use case for budget governance Cost-per-inference tracked per use case for budget governance | MDL | None | Built-in |
| MDL-033 | Model card schema enforced with mandatory fields (use, limits, eval, risks) Model card schema enforced with mandatory fields (use, limits, eval, risks) | MDL | None | Built-in |
| MDL-034 | Model weights integrity verified via cryptographic hash at load time Model weights integrity verified via cryptographic hash at load time | MDL | None | Built-in |
| MDL-035 | Model artifacts signed with organizational code-signing certificate Model artifacts signed with organizational code-signing certificate | MDL | None | Built-in |
| MDL-036 | Model parameter count, architecture, and license documented per release Model parameter count, architecture, and license documented per release | MDL | None | Built-in |
| MDL-037 | Training compute tracked (FLOPs, tokens, wall-clock) per model Training compute tracked (FLOPs, tokens, wall-clock) per model | MDL | None | Built-in |
| MDL-038 | Model lineage traces base model, fine-tune dataset, and hyperparameters Model lineage traces base model, fine-tune dataset, and hyperparameters | MDL | None | Built-in |
| MDL-039 | Model watermarking applied where IP protection required Model watermarking applied where IP protection required | MDL | None | Built-in |
| MDL-040 | Model extraction attack detection wired to monitoring Model extraction attack detection wired to monitoring | MDL | None | Built-in |
| MDL-041 | Distillation defense for proprietary models (query rate, output noise) Distillation defense for proprietary models (query rate, output noise) | MDL | None | Built-in |
| MDL-042 | Embedding model versioned, pinned, and registered in catalog Embedding model versioned, pinned, and registered in catalog | MDL | None | Built-in |
| MDL-043 | Tokenizer version pinned and tested for compatibility on upgrade Tokenizer version pinned and tested for compatibility on upgrade | MDL | None | Built-in |
| MDL-044 | Model rollback artifact retained for at least n-2 production versions Model rollback artifact retained for at least n-2 production versions | MDL | None | Built-in |
| MDL-045 | Model registry access audited and segregated from production deploy Model registry access audited and segregated from production deploy | MDL | None | Built-in |
| model_identification | Model Identification Requires that each inference record the model name, version, and provider that produced it, establishing a per-call model ledger that underpins the model inventory and technical documentation obligations. This matters for EU AI Act Art. 11 / Annex IV technical documentation, NIST AI RMF MAP 1/MAP 2 context-mapping, SR 11-7 model inventory, ISO 42001 A.6.2.4, and SOC 2 CC2.1. EvidentAI evidences it by tagging spans where gen_ai.request.model is present and mapping that identification coverage to the frameworks, so an auditor can confirm no inference ran on an unregistered or unattributed model. | — | Built-in | |
| MON-001 | All AI workloads send logs to centralized SIEM All AI workloads send logs to centralized SIEM | MON | None | Built-in |
| MON-002 | Cost anomaly alerts configured per AI workload Cost anomaly alerts configured per AI workload | MON | None | Built-in |
| MON-003 | Inference latency SLIs tracked at p50, p95, p99 Inference latency SLIs tracked at p50, p95, p99 | MON | None | Built-in |
| MON-004 | Error rate SLI tracked per endpoint (4xx, 5xx, model errors) Error rate SLI tracked per endpoint (4xx, 5xx, model errors) | MON | None | Built-in |
| MON-005 | Security alerts triaged within one hour by on-call rotation Security alerts triaged within one hour by on-call rotation | MON | None | Built-in |
| MON-006 | AI-specific incident response playbook current and reviewed annually AI-specific incident response playbook current and reviewed annually | MON | None | Built-in |
| MON-007 | Tabletop exercises conducted twice yearly including model-failure scenarios Tabletop exercises conducted twice yearly including model-failure scenarios | MON | None | Built-in |
| MON-008 | Vendor incident notifications received and triaged within 24 hours Vendor incident notifications received and triaged within 24 hours | MON | None | Built-in |
| MON-009 | Audit log immutability enforced via WORM or equivalent Audit log immutability enforced via WORM or equivalent | MON | None | Built-in |
| MON-010 | Regulator notification process documented (GDPR 72hr, NYDFS, state breach) Regulator notification process documented (GDPR 72hr, NYDFS, state breach) | MON | None | Built-in |
| MON-011 | Blameless postmortem published within 5 business days of major incident Blameless postmortem published within 5 business days of major incident | MON | None | Built-in |
| MON-012 | Customer notification SLAs defined and met per incident severity Customer notification SLAs defined and met per incident severity | MON | None | Built-in |
| MON-013 | AI-specific KPIs included in service health dashboards AI-specific KPIs included in service health dashboards | MON | None | Built-in |
| MON-014 | Model degradation detected within 15 minutes of threshold breach Model degradation detected within 15 minutes of threshold breach | MON | None | Built-in |
| MON-015 | Inference token consumption tracked per tenant Inference token consumption tracked per tenant | MON | None | Built-in |
| MON-016 | Inference quotas enforced and breach-alerted Inference quotas enforced and breach-alerted | MON | None | Built-in |
| MON-017 | Concept drift alert routing per use case Concept drift alert routing per use case | MON | None | Built-in |
| MON-018 | Data drift alert routing per feature and per use case Data drift alert routing per feature and per use case | MON | None | Built-in |
| MON-019 | Anomalous user behavior detected (UEBA) on AI platform Anomalous user behavior detected (UEBA) on AI platform | MON | None | Built-in |
| MON-020 | Honeytoken / canary content monitoring on RAG indexes Honeytoken / canary content monitoring on RAG indexes | MON | None | Built-in |
| MON-021 | Forensic packet capture available for critical incidents Forensic packet capture available for critical incidents | MON | None | Built-in |
| MON-022 | Incident classification per harm taxonomy (model harm vs security) Incident classification per harm taxonomy (model harm vs security) | MON | None | Built-in |
| MON-023 | Regulator-mandated logging fields captured (EU AI Act Art. 12) Regulator-mandated logging fields captured (EU AI Act Art. 12) | MON | None | Built-in |
| MON-024 | Logs aggregated to enable cross-system correlation Logs aggregated to enable cross-system correlation | MON | None | Built-in |
| MON-025 | Reverse-engineering / model-extraction detection in place Reverse-engineering / model-extraction detection in place | MON | None | Built-in |
| MON-026 | Membership-inference attack monitoring in production Membership-inference attack monitoring in production | MON | None | Built-in |
| MON-027 | Audit log SIEM coverage measured and reported Audit log SIEM coverage measured and reported | MON | None | Built-in |
| MON-028 | Customer-facing status page updated within 15 minutes of declared incident Customer-facing status page updated within 15 minutes of declared incident | MON | None | Built-in |
| MON-029 | Token consumption anomaly alerts per tenant Token consumption anomaly alerts per tenant | MON | None | Built-in |
| MON-030 | Latency p99 anomaly alerts per endpoint Latency p99 anomaly alerts per endpoint | MON | None | Built-in |
| MON-031 | Cost-per-inference anomaly alerts Cost-per-inference anomaly alerts | MON | None | Built-in |
| MON-032 | Refusal-pattern anomalies trigger investigation Refusal-pattern anomalies trigger investigation | MON | None | Built-in |
| MON-033 | Response length anomalies trigger investigation Response length anomalies trigger investigation | MON | None | Built-in |
| MON-034 | Cross-tenant correlation prohibited in observability dashboards Cross-tenant correlation prohibited in observability dashboards | MON | None | Built-in |
| MON-035 | AI-specific KPIs reported to executive dashboard quarterly AI-specific KPIs reported to executive dashboard quarterly | MON | None | Built-in |
| MON-036 | Toxic / unsafe output rate reported per use case Toxic / unsafe output rate reported per use case | MON | None | Built-in |
| MON-037 | Tool-call failure rate monitored and alerted Tool-call failure rate monitored and alerted | MON | None | Built-in |
| MON-038 | Agent loop / recursion anomalies detected Agent loop / recursion anomalies detected | MON | None | Built-in |
| MON-039 | Response sentiment / quality monitored against baseline Response sentiment / quality monitored against baseline | MON | None | Built-in |
| MON-040 | Heartbeat from agents continuously aggregated for liveness Heartbeat from agents continuously aggregated for liveness | MON | None | Built-in |
| pii_detection_redaction | PII Detection / Redaction Requires that personally identifiable information appearing in agent prompts, outputs, or logs be detected and redacted, supporting GDPR data-minimization (Art. 5(1)(c)), HIPAA §164.514 de-identification, and SOC 2 confidentiality commitments. Unredacted PII in model context or transcripts is a leakage and breach-notification trigger, so detection must be evidenced on every invocation rather than sampled. EvidentAI runs this control through the pii-redactor evaluator, matching spans where evidentai.pii.detected == true and tagging them into the evidence framework_mappings, and pairs the result with the NIST AI RMF MEASURE-3.1 output-PII test so coverage is measured against a threshold. | — | Built-in | |
| PRM-001 | System prompts stored in version control only; no production-edit paths System prompts stored in version control only; no production-edit paths | PRM | None | Built-in |
| PRM-002 | Prompt changes require peer review and PR approval Prompt changes require peer review and PR approval | PRM | None | Built-in |
| PRM-003 | Prompt injection defense tested against adversarial suite before deploy Prompt injection defense tested against adversarial suite before deploy | PRM | None | Built-in |
| PRM-004 | Agents declare permitted tools in a manifest registered with platform Agents declare permitted tools in a manifest registered with platform | PRM | None | Built-in |
| PRM-005 | Tool-call results logged with normalized I/O to canonical evidence schema Tool-call results logged with normalized I/O to canonical evidence schema | PRM | None | Built-in |
| PRM-006 | Agent identity propagated to downstream tool calls (on-behalf-of) Agent identity propagated to downstream tool calls (on-behalf-of) | PRM | None | Built-in |
| PRM-007 | Tool allowlist enforced at runtime, not solely in prompt instructions Tool allowlist enforced at runtime, not solely in prompt instructions | PRM | None | Built-in |
| PRM-008 | Multi-turn agent loops bounded by max-step and max-cost limits Multi-turn agent loops bounded by max-step and max-cost limits | PRM | None | Built-in |
| PRM-009 | Human-in-the-loop required for high-risk agent actions Human-in-the-loop required for high-risk agent actions | PRM | None | Built-in |
| PRM-010 | Agent memory subject to documented retention and deletion policy Agent memory subject to documented retention and deletion policy | PRM | None | Built-in |
| PRM-011 | Prompt templates reviewed for sensitive data leakage before publish Prompt templates reviewed for sensitive data leakage before publish | PRM | None | Built-in |
| PRM-012 | Function-calling schemas validated against registered tool registry Function-calling schemas validated against registered tool registry | PRM | None | Built-in |
| PRM-013 | Agent traces exported to canonical evidence schema for GRC ingestion Agent traces exported to canonical evidence schema for GRC ingestion | PRM | None | Built-in |
| PRM-014 | Adversarial prompt suite executed per release (min 200 vectors) Adversarial prompt suite executed per release (min 200 vectors) | PRM | None | Built-in |
| PRM-015 | Agent action approval policy mapped to control risk tier Agent action approval policy mapped to control risk tier | PRM | None | Built-in |
| PRM-016 | PII in prompts flagged and redacted before logging PII in prompts flagged and redacted before logging | PRM | None | Built-in |
| PRM-017 | Prompt library inventoried by use case and reviewed quarterly Prompt library inventoried by use case and reviewed quarterly | PRM | None | Built-in |
| PRM-018 | System and user prompts logged in separate, role-tagged channels System and user prompts logged in separate, role-tagged channels | PRM | None | Built-in |
| PRM-019 | Prompt evaluation suite runs nightly on production prompts Prompt evaluation suite runs nightly on production prompts | PRM | None | Built-in |
| PRM-020 | Prompt diffs reviewed for security and policy implications Prompt diffs reviewed for security and policy implications | PRM | None | Built-in |
| PRM-021 | Tool-call cost limits enforced per agent per session Tool-call cost limits enforced per agent per session | PRM | None | Built-in |
| PRM-022 | Agent escalation policy executed when limits exceeded Agent escalation policy executed when limits exceeded | PRM | None | Built-in |
| PRM-023 | Long-running agents emit periodic heartbeats to monitoring Long-running agents emit periodic heartbeats to monitoring | PRM | None | Built-in |
| PRM-024 | Agent task queues persisted to enable replay Agent task queues persisted to enable replay | PRM | None | Built-in |
| PRM-025 | Tool definitions versioned using semantic versioning Tool definitions versioned using semantic versioning | PRM | None | Built-in |
| PRM-026 | Tool deprecation notices issued to consumers with 30-day window Tool deprecation notices issued to consumers with 30-day window | PRM | None | Built-in |
| PRM-027 | Function-call arguments validated at runtime against schema Function-call arguments validated at runtime against schema | PRM | None | Built-in |
| PRM-028 | Agent reasoning traces redacted of secrets before storage Agent reasoning traces redacted of secrets before storage | PRM | None | Built-in |
| PRM-029 | Vector tool memory subject to per-tenant isolation Vector tool memory subject to per-tenant isolation | PRM | None | Built-in |
| PRM-030 | Agent identity attested via signed token at tool boundary Agent identity attested via signed token at tool boundary | PRM | None | Built-in |
| PRM-031 | Agent workflows tested for replay safety and idempotency Agent workflows tested for replay safety and idempotency | PRM | None | Built-in |
| PRM-032 | Cross-agent communication restricted to declared topology Cross-agent communication restricted to declared topology | PRM | None | Built-in |
| PRM-033 | Prompt metadata schema enforced (purpose, owner, risk tier, dependencies) Prompt metadata schema enforced (purpose, owner, risk tier, dependencies) | PRM | None | Built-in |
| PRM-034 | Prompt content hash recorded for integrity verification at runtime Prompt content hash recorded for integrity verification at runtime | PRM | None | Built-in |
| PRM-035 | Prompt taxonomy maintained with categories, tags, and risk classifications Prompt taxonomy maintained with categories, tags, and risk classifications | PRM | None | Built-in |
| PRM-036 | Prompt regression suite executed per release with go/no-go criteria Prompt regression suite executed per release with go/no-go criteria | PRM | None | Built-in |
| PRM-037 | Prompt cost attribution tracked per use case and per tenant Prompt cost attribution tracked per use case and per tenant | PRM | None | Built-in |
| PRM-038 | Indirect prompt injection from retrieved content tested and defended Indirect prompt injection from retrieved content tested and defended | PRM | None | Built-in |
| PRM-039 | Prompt template variables validated against allowlist before assembly Prompt template variables validated against allowlist before assembly | PRM | None | Built-in |
| PRM-040 | Prompt assembly logged with all components (template, vars, retrieved context) Prompt assembly logged with all components (template, vars, retrieved context) | PRM | None | Built-in |
| PRM-041 | Agent metadata schema enforced (capability, risk class, owner, dependencies) Agent metadata schema enforced (capability, risk class, owner, dependencies) | PRM | None | Built-in |
| PRM-042 | Agent capability declarations validated against runtime enforcement Agent capability declarations validated against runtime enforcement | PRM | None | Built-in |
| PRM-043 | Agent goal alignment monitored via output classifier Agent goal alignment monitored via output classifier | PRM | None | Built-in |
| PRM-044 | Sub-agent provenance tracked through multi-agent invocation chains Sub-agent provenance tracked through multi-agent invocation chains | PRM | None | Built-in |
| PRM-045 | Agent runtime sandboxed with resource and network restrictions Agent runtime sandboxed with resource and network restrictions | PRM | None | Built-in |
| prompt_injection_detection | Prompt-Injection Detection Requires active screening of model inputs for prompt-injection and jailbreak attempts, including indirect injection arriving through tool or retrieval I/O, so adversarial instructions cannot subvert the agent. It maps to OWASP LLM01 Prompt Injection, MITRE ATLAS AML.T0051, NIST AI RMF MEASURE 2.7, and SOC 2 CC6.6 logical-access protection. EvidentAI evidences it by tagging spans where prompt_injection.flagged == true emitted by the detector, and maps those flagged spans to the frameworks as both detection-coverage proof and the incident trail for any attempt caught. | — | Built-in | |
| prompt_logging_capture | Prompt / Response Logging Requires durable capture of the full prompt and corresponding response for each agent call, providing the books-and-records and replay trail regulators expect for AI-assisted decisions. This satisfies FINRA Rule 4511 and SEC Investment Advisers Act §204-2 recordkeeping, NIST AI RMF MEASURE 3, ISO 42001 A.6.2.8, and SOC 2 CC7.2. EvidentAI evidences it by tagging spans that carry prompt.text (the captured prompt content) and mapping logging completeness to the frameworks, demonstrating that interactions are recorded and retrievable for post-hoc review. | — | None | Built-in |
| REG-001 | EU AI Act classification documented per use case (Annex III mapped) EU AI Act classification documented per use case (Annex III mapped) | REG | None | Built-in |
| REG-002 | NIST AI RMF profile maintained covering Govern, Map, Measure, Manage NIST AI RMF profile maintained covering Govern, Map, Measure, Manage | REG | None | Built-in |
| REG-003 | ISO / IEC 42001 AI management system documented for external certification ISO / IEC 42001 AI management system documented for external certification | REG | None | Built-in |
| REG-004 | Banking model risk management aligned to SR 11-7 where applicable Banking model risk management aligned to SR 11-7 where applicable | REG | None | Built-in |
| REG-005 | Fair-lending review conducted for credit decisioning models Fair-lending review conducted for credit decisioning models | REG | None | Built-in |
| REG-006 | HIPAA Business Associate Agreement in place for healthcare workloads HIPAA Business Associate Agreement in place for healthcare workloads | REG | None | Built-in |
| REG-007 | SOC 2 Type II audit completed annually SOC 2 Type II audit completed annually | REG | None | Built-in |
| REG-008 | Annual third-party penetration test conducted Annual third-party penetration test conducted | REG | None | Built-in |
| REG-009 | Internal audit reviews AI controls annually with findings tracked to closure Internal audit reviews AI controls annually with findings tracked to closure | REG | None | Built-in |
| REG-010 | Board-level reporting on AI risk produced quarterly with key risk indicators Board-level reporting on AI risk produced quarterly with key risk indicators | REG | None | Built-in |
| REG-011 | Customer-facing AI disclosures and transparency notices current Customer-facing AI disclosures and transparency notices current | REG | None | Built-in |
| REG-012 | Model documentation package exportable on demand for regulator inquiry Model documentation package exportable on demand for regulator inquiry | REG | None | Built-in |
| REG-013 | EU AI Act technical documentation maintained per Article 11 EU AI Act technical documentation maintained per Article 11 | REG | None | Built-in |
| REG-014 | EU AI Act post-market monitoring system operational EU AI Act post-market monitoring system operational | REG | None | Built-in |
| REG-015 | EU AI Act serious incident reporting process tested annually EU AI Act serious incident reporting process tested annually | REG | None | Built-in |
| REG-016 | EU AI Act conformity assessment completed for high-risk systems EU AI Act conformity assessment completed for high-risk systems | REG | None | Built-in |
| REG-017 | GDPR Records of Processing Activities (ROPA) current GDPR Records of Processing Activities (ROPA) current | REG | None | Built-in |
| REG-018 | Data Protection Officer designated and contactable Data Protection Officer designated and contactable | REG | None | Built-in |
| REG-019 | CPRA-required registrations and disclosures filed (where applicable) CPRA-required registrations and disclosures filed (where applicable) | REG | None | Built-in |
| REG-020 | Colorado AI Act consumer disclosure produced (where applicable) Colorado AI Act consumer disclosure produced (where applicable) | REG | None | Built-in |
| REG-021 | NYC Local Law 144 audit for AEDT completed (where applicable) NYC Local Law 144 audit for AEDT completed (where applicable) | REG | None | Built-in |
| REG-022 | Illinois BIPA compliance for biometric processing Illinois BIPA compliance for biometric processing | REG | None | Built-in |
| REG-023 | FTC Section 5 unfair / deceptive practices review for AI features FTC Section 5 unfair / deceptive practices review for AI features | REG | None | Built-in |
| REG-024 | Insurance regulator AI bulletin compliance (NAIC Model Bulletin) Insurance regulator AI bulletin compliance (NAIC Model Bulletin) | REG | None | Built-in |
| REG-025 | State insurance department filings for ML rating models State insurance department filings for ML rating models | REG | None | Built-in |
| REG-026 | SEC AI disclosures in 10-K / 10-Q (where applicable) SEC AI disclosures in 10-K / 10-Q (where applicable) | REG | None | Built-in |
| REG-027 | CCAR / DFAST stress-test model coverage documented (where applicable) CCAR / DFAST stress-test model coverage documented (where applicable) | REG | None | Built-in |
| REG-028 | CECL allowance model SR 11-7 alignment documented CECL allowance model SR 11-7 alignment documented | REG | None | Built-in |
| risk_management_policy | Risk Management Policy Written, board-overseen AI risk management policy referencing applicable regulatory frameworks. AI Governance Council with explicit board reporting line. | governance | None | Built-in |
| SAF-001 | Content safety filters enabled on all generative endpoints Content safety filters enabled on all generative endpoints | SAF | None | Built-in |
| SAF-002 | Output classification policy mapped to use-case severity Output classification policy mapped to use-case severity | SAF | None | Built-in |
| SAF-003 | Jailbreak attempts logged and trigger SIEM alert Jailbreak attempts logged and trigger SIEM alert | SAF | None | Built-in |
| SAF-004 | Rate limits enforced per user and per tenant at API gateway Rate limits enforced per user and per tenant at API gateway | SAF | None | Built-in |
| SAF-005 | PII exfiltration detector runs on model outputs PII exfiltration detector runs on model outputs | SAF | None | Built-in |
| SAF-006 | Hallucination rate tracked per use case with eval set per release Hallucination rate tracked per use case with eval set per release | SAF | None | Built-in |
| SAF-007 | Refusal rate tracked per content category for business-impact review Refusal rate tracked per content category for business-impact review | SAF | None | Built-in |
| SAF-008 | Grounding score required above threshold for RAG responses Grounding score required above threshold for RAG responses | SAF | None | Built-in |
| SAF-009 | Source citations enforced for factual claims in regulated workflows Source citations enforced for factual claims in regulated workflows | SAF | None | Built-in |
| SAF-010 | Output language matched to user locale for regulated communications Output language matched to user locale for regulated communications | SAF | None | Built-in |
| SAF-011 | Disallowed-topic list enforced at policy gateway pre-LLM Disallowed-topic list enforced at policy gateway pre-LLM | SAF | None | Built-in |
| SAF-012 | Toxicity classifier reviewed quarterly for drift and calibration Toxicity classifier reviewed quarterly for drift and calibration | SAF | None | Built-in |
| SAF-013 | External red-team exercise conducted twice yearly External red-team exercise conducted twice yearly | SAF | None | Built-in |
| SAF-014 | Customer-configurable safety threshold available per workspace Customer-configurable safety threshold available per workspace | SAF | None | Built-in |
| SAF-015 | Multimodal input safety classifier scans text, image, and audio inputs Multimodal input safety classifier scans text, image, and audio inputs | SAF | None | Built-in |
| SAF-016 | Image steganography detection on uploaded images Image steganography detection on uploaded images | SAF | None | Built-in |
| SAF-017 | Audio deepfake detection for voice-input use cases Audio deepfake detection for voice-input use cases | SAF | None | Built-in |
| SAF-018 | Document parsers sandboxed (no formula or macro execution) Document parsers sandboxed (no formula or macro execution) | SAF | None | Built-in |
| SAF-019 | URL-based content fetched through safe-browsing gateway URL-based content fetched through safe-browsing gateway | SAF | None | Built-in |
| SAF-020 | Indirect prompt injection scanner runs on all retrieved content Indirect prompt injection scanner runs on all retrieved content | SAF | None | Built-in |
| SAF-021 | Synthetic content provenance attached per C2PA / regulatory standard Synthetic content provenance attached per C2PA / regulatory standard | SAF | None | Built-in |
| SAF-022 | Output watermarking applied for AI-generated content where required Output watermarking applied for AI-generated content where required | SAF | None | Built-in |
| SAF-023 | Refusal taxonomy maintained and reviewed quarterly Refusal taxonomy maintained and reviewed quarterly | SAF | None | Built-in |
| SAF-024 | Sensitive-topic policy maintained with regional / jurisdictional variants Sensitive-topic policy maintained with regional / jurisdictional variants | SAF | None | Built-in |
| SAF-025 | Cross-language safety evaluation performed for supported languages Cross-language safety evaluation performed for supported languages | SAF | None | Built-in |
| SAF-026 | Code-injection detection on tool-call arguments Code-injection detection on tool-call arguments | SAF | None | Built-in |
| SAF-027 | Prompt-shield service evaluates each turn for jailbreak indicators Prompt-shield service evaluates each turn for jailbreak indicators | SAF | None | Built-in |
| SAF-028 | Safety regression suite blocks releases below configured threshold Safety regression suite blocks releases below configured threshold | SAF | None | Built-in |
| SAF-029 | Output filtered for self-harm and crisis indicators with escalation path Output filtered for self-harm and crisis indicators with escalation path | SAF | None | Built-in |
| SAF-030 | Hate-speech classifier reviewed and re-trained periodically Hate-speech classifier reviewed and re-trained periodically | SAF | None | Built-in |
| SAF-031 | Sexual-content classifier applied across modalities Sexual-content classifier applied across modalities | SAF | None | Built-in |
| SAF-032 | CBRN content classifier blocks dangerous-uplift outputs CBRN content classifier blocks dangerous-uplift outputs | SAF | None | Built-in |
| SAF-033 | Election-integrity content rules enforced during election windows Election-integrity content rules enforced during election windows | SAF | None | Built-in |
| SAF-034 | Cybersecurity-misuse classifier applied to outputs Cybersecurity-misuse classifier applied to outputs | SAF | None | Built-in |
| SAF-035 | Output style and tone constraints enforced for brand and regulatory contexts Output style and tone constraints enforced for brand and regulatory contexts | SAF | None | Built-in |
| sampling_parameter_change_tracking | Sampling-Parameter Change Tracking Requires tracking changes to LLM sampling parameters (temperature, top_p, top_k, seed, max_tokens, frequency/presence penalty) that materially shift the output distribution, treating such changes as governed model-change events rather than silent configuration drift. This supports SR 11-7 change management, NIST AI RMF MANAGE 4.3, ISO 42001 A.6.2.7, and EU AI Act Art. 17 quality-management obligations. EvidentAI evidences it by tagging spans where sampling.params is present, recording the active parameters per call so deltas against the approved baseline can be flagged and mapped to the frameworks as change-control evidence. | — | None | Built-in |
| sanctions_screening_check | OFAC Sanctions Screening Requires screening of customers, counterparties, and transactions against OFAC's Specially Designated Nationals and consolidated sanctions lists before funds move, with a recorded match disposition (clear, potential match, or confirmed hit) to prevent prohibited dealings. OFAC liability is strict, so an unscreened or mis-dispositioned transaction can trigger blocking obligations and penalties regardless of intent. EvidentAI tags spans where ofac.match_status is present, preserving the screened entity, list version, and disposition, and maps the evidence to OFAC sanctions-compliance controls and the NIST AI RMF MEASURE function for false-positive/negative oversight. | — | None | Built-in |
| soc2_c1_1_confidentiality_filter | SOC 2 C1.1 — Confidentiality Filter Requires that information designated confidential is filtered or stripped before it leaves the system boundary, satisfying the SOC 2 Confidentiality category criterion C1.1 (identify and maintain confidential information) so that protected data is not disclosed through model outputs, tool calls, or logs. This matters because LLM agents routinely echo or relay sensitive inputs, and an unfiltered output is a direct confidentiality breach and a reportable exception in a SOC 2 Type II audit. EvidentAI evidences it via the pii-redactor evaluator: spans where the selector matches `evidentai.confidentiality.filtered == true` are tagged and mapped to the SOC 2 C1.1 reference, producing a continuous record that the confidentiality filter ran on each governed turn rather than a point-in-time attestation. | — | Built-in | |
| soc2_cc6_8_inference_rate_limit | SOC 2 CC6.8 — Inference Rate Limiting Requires that inference access is attributed to an authenticated principal and rate-limited per principal, mapping to SOC 2 Common Criterion CC6.8 (prevent or detect unauthorized or malicious use of the system). Per-principal limiting is the control that contains credential abuse, runaway clients, and denial-of-wallet against a metered model endpoint, and unattributed inference defeats both authorization and abuse detection. EvidentAI evidences it by matching the selector `evidentai.principal` present on each inference span, confirming every call carries the caller identity needed to enforce and audit the rate limit, and tagging the span to the CC6.8 reference so the control is demonstrably exercised on live traffic. | — | None | Built-in |
| soc2_cc7_3_incident_capture | SOC 2 CC7.3 — Incident Capture Requires that operational anomalies and errors are detected and captured as security/incident events, satisfying SOC 2 Common Criterion CC7.3 (evaluate events to determine whether they represent a security incident). Reliable incident capture is the foundation of incident response and breach-notification timelines, and a silently dropped agent error is both an availability gap and an undetected-incident finding. EvidentAI evidences it by matching the OTel selector `span_status.code == 2` (ERROR), which both tags the span to the CC7.3 reference and triggers the finding-generator to raise an agent_error finding, giving the auditor a traceable chain from the failed span to the captured incident record. | — | None | Built-in |
| soc2_pi1_2_output_verification | SOC 2 PI1.2 — Output Verification Requires that processing output is validated against defined specifications before it is relied upon, mapping to SOC 2 Processing Integrity criterion PI1.2 (system processing is complete, accurate, timely, and authorized). For agentic systems this is the guardrail that a model response was schema-checked, grounded, or otherwise verified before it drove a downstream action, without which incorrect or fabricated output flows through unchecked. EvidentAI evidences it by matching the selector on the presence of `evidentai.output.validated` on each output span and tagging it to the PI1.2 reference, yielding continuous proof that output verification was invoked on governed turns rather than asserted in policy alone. | — | None | Built-in |
| subtree_aggregate_budget | Subtree Aggregate Budget Requires that token, cost, action-count, and wall-clock budgets be attributed to the root run and decremented across every descendant in the causal subtree — a child draws from the root's budget and never gets a fresh one, and no descendant may reset a limit set above it (req-20 R-9). This ties the cross-workflow runaway control to the AI-spend per-trace token_budget, extended from one trace to the whole initiation subtree. EvidentAI evidences it by summing usage across the descendant set keyed to the root run and raising a breach (and, in enforce mode, halting the subtree) when the aggregate ceiling is crossed. | — | None | Built-in |
| suitability_best_interest_check | Suitability / Best-Interest Check This control confirms that before an AI agent recommends a security or strategy, a suitability and best-interest evaluation against the customer's investment profile (risk tolerance, objectives, financial situation, and time horizon) was performed. It implements SEC Reg BI's Care Obligation and FINRA Rule 2111 (Suitability), where recommendations made without a documented best-interest basis are a core source of customer-harm and enforcement exposure. EvidentAI tags spans where suitability.checked is true, evidencing that the check ran and recording its inputs and outcome, and maps the result to retail-conduct and Care-Obligation control frameworks. | — | None | Built-in |
| tool_use_governance | Tool-Use Governance Requires that agent tool and plugin invocations be restricted to an approved allowlist, preventing over-privileged or insecurely designed tool access from extending the agent's reach. It maps to OWASP LLM07 Insecure Plugin Design, MITRE ATLAS AML.T0053, NIST AI RMF MEASURE 2.6, ISO 42001 A.6.2.6, and SOC 2 CC6.1. EvidentAI evidences it by tagging spans carrying tool_call.allowlisted, which record whether each invoked tool was on the sanctioned list, and maps that coverage to the frameworks so auditors can confirm tool use was gated rather than open-ended. | — | Built-in | |
| TPR-001 | AI vendor inventory current with subprocessors mapped AI vendor inventory current with subprocessors mapped | TPR | None | Built-in |
| TPR-002 | Vendor security questionnaire completed per onboarding Vendor security questionnaire completed per onboarding | TPR | None | Built-in |
| TPR-003 | DPA signed with all AI vendors processing personal data DPA signed with all AI vendors processing personal data | TPR | None | Built-in |
| TPR-004 | AUP reviewed for AI vendor terms (training restrictions, retention) AUP reviewed for AI vendor terms (training restrictions, retention) | TPR | None | Built-in |
| TPR-005 | Vendor SOC 2 reports reviewed annually with finding analysis Vendor SOC 2 reports reviewed annually with finding analysis | TPR | None | Built-in |
| TPR-006 | Vendor incident notification SLA contractual (24 hours target) Vendor incident notification SLA contractual (24 hours target) | TPR | None | Built-in |
| TPR-007 | Vendor breach exit plan documented per critical vendor Vendor breach exit plan documented per critical vendor | TPR | None | Built-in |
| TPR-008 | Vendor financial viability assessed annually Vendor financial viability assessed annually | TPR | None | Built-in |
| TPR-009 | Vendor concentration risk monitored at portfolio level Vendor concentration risk monitored at portfolio level | TPR | None | Built-in |
| TPR-010 | Open-source model license compliance reviewed (Llama, etc.) Open-source model license compliance reviewed (Llama, etc.) | TPR | None | Built-in |
| TPR-011 | Foundation model API terms reviewed for training opt-out Foundation model API terms reviewed for training opt-out | TPR | None | Built-in |
| TPR-012 | Vendor pricing change notifications tracked Vendor pricing change notifications tracked | TPR | None | Built-in |
| TPR-013 | Vendor model card / system card reviewed at onboarding Vendor model card / system card reviewed at onboarding | TPR | None | Built-in |
| TPR-014 | Vendor model lineage (base + fine-tune chain) documented Vendor model lineage (base + fine-tune chain) documented | TPR | None | Built-in |
| TPR-015 | Vendor evaluation against alternative providers (annual) Vendor evaluation against alternative providers (annual) | TPR | None | Built-in |
| TPR-016 | Vendor lock-in risk mitigated by abstraction layer Vendor lock-in risk mitigated by abstraction layer | TPR | None | Built-in |
| TPR-017 | Cross-border vendor transfer mechanisms in place Cross-border vendor transfer mechanisms in place | TPR | None | Built-in |
| TPR-018 | Subcontractor approval required for critical vendors Subcontractor approval required for critical vendors | TPR | None | Built-in |
| TPR-019 | Vendor right-to-audit clause exercised on critical vendors Vendor right-to-audit clause exercised on critical vendors | TPR | None | Built-in |
| TPR-020 | Vendor termination data return process tested Vendor termination data return process tested | TPR | None | Built-in |
| TPR-021 | Open-source model fine-tune output license respected Open-source model fine-tune output license respected | TPR | None | Built-in |
| TPR-022 | Marketplace model (HuggingFace, etc.) provenance verified Marketplace model (HuggingFace, etc.) provenance verified | TPR | None | Built-in |
| TPR-023 | Foundation model API rate-limit headroom monitored per vendor Foundation model API rate-limit headroom monitored per vendor | TPR | None | Built-in |
| TPR-024 | Vendor model deprecation tracked and migration planned Vendor model deprecation tracked and migration planned | TPR | None | Built-in |
| TPR-025 | Vendor outage / degradation routed via fallback model Vendor outage / degradation routed via fallback model | TPR | None | Built-in |
| trace_correlation_integrity | Trace Correlation Integrity Requires that trace_id and parent_span_id propagate correctly across multi-agent and multi-tool calls so a complete, unbroken execution graph can be reconstructed, with orphan spans surfaced as integrity gaps. Coherent correlation is the foundation for auditable AI behavior under NIST AI RMF MEASURE 3, ISO 42001 A.6.2.8, and SOC 2 CC7.2 continuous-monitoring criteria. EvidentAI evidences it by tagging spans that carry a present, correlatable trace_id and mapping correlation completeness to the frameworks, proving the telemetry on which all other evidence depends is itself trustworthy and traceable end to end. | — | Built-in | |
| transparency_disclosure | Transparency / Disclosure Customer-facing transparency: AI-use disclosure, model facts label, instructions for use, contact-a-human pathways. Pre-decision notice where required. | governance | Built-in | |
| vendor_supply_chain | Vendor / Supply Chain Third-party AI due diligence, contractual rights (audit, exit, IP, security), ongoing monitoring, and termination procedures for vendor models. | governance | None | Built-in |
| workflow_initiation_provenance | Workflow Initiation Provenance Requires that every workflow run record its initiator (the run and span that caused it, or the external trigger), its root originator (the human or trigger at the top of the chain, propagated unchanged down every hop), and its depth — so that for any action the full path from root originator through each initiation edge is reconstructable (req-20 R-1/R-2/R-3). A non-root run that cannot name its initiator is marked incomplete provenance rather than dropped. EvidentAI evidences it from the first-class workflow_run_edge initiation records and the per-run initiator/root/depth fields, distinguishing initiation (caused-by, separate run, a span link) from parent-child containment within a single run. | — | None | Built-in |